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identify the claimants that were within the various classifica-
tions discussed earlier. The commission should therefore be 
required to take whatever additional evidence is necessary 
and to make determinations as to the individual claimants in 
accord with the views herein expressed. (See Bila v. Young, 
20 Cal.2d 865, 870 [129 P.2d 364] ; Helvering v. Rankin, 295 
U.S. 123, 131 [55 S.Ot. 732, 79 L.Ed. 1343]; Federal Com-
munications Com. v. Pottsville Broadcasting Co., 309 U.S. 134, 
145 [60 S.Ct. 437, 84 L.Ed. 656] ; Helvering v. Smith, 132 F. 
2d 965, 968.) 
Let a peremptory writ of mandate issue ordering the com-
mission to proceed as herein directed. 
Gibson, C. J., Shenk, J., Curtis, J., and Edmonds, J., 
concurred. 
CARTER, J.-I dissent upon the same grounds as set forth 
in my dissenting opinion in Matson Terminals, Inc., v. Cali-
fornia Emp. Com., this day filed, ante, p. 711 [151 P.2d 
211]. 
In this case, however, the initiai determination by the ad-
justment unit was age,inst the employees. On appeal the 
referee allowed benefits, and the allowance was affirmed by 
the commission. The unemployment occurred in June, 1939. 
At that time section 67 of the California Unemployment In-
surance Act as amended in 1937 was in effect, and it provided 
that benefits were payable regardless of any appeal where 
there had been either an allowance of benefits by the adjust-
ment unit followed by an affirmance by the referee or an al-
lowance by a referee followed by an affirmance by the com-
mission (Stats. 1937, p. 2059). Although the proceedings to 
determine the claim for benefits occurred after the 1939 
amendment went into effect, there is nothing in that amend-
ment to indicate that it is retroactive. The right to benefits 
regardless of appeal is a substantive right which should not 
be defeated by a subsequent change in the law at least unless 
such an intent clearly appears. 
In my opinion the writ should be denied. 
Schauer, J., concurred. 
Interveners' petition for a rehearing was denied September 
13, 1944. Carter, J., and Schauer, J., voted for a rehearing. 
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BUNNY'S WAFFLE SHOP, INC. (a Corporation) et al., 
Petitioners, v. CALIFORNIA EMPLOYMENT COM-
MISSION et al., Respondents; MITCHELL VEZILICH 
et al., Interveners and Respondents. 
(1] Unemployment Relief - Disquali1l.cation - Leaving Work Be. 
cause of Trade Dispute. - Unemployment Insurance Act, 
§ 56(a) (Stats. 1935, p.1226, as amended; Deering's Gen. Laws, 
1937, Act 8780d), does not disqualify an employee from re-
ceiving benefits in all cases where his unemployment results 
directly or indirectly from a labor dispute, but makes him 
ineligible only if he left his work because of the dispute. There 
must therefore, be a direct causal connection between the trade 
dispute and the leaving of work. 
[2a, 2b] Id.-Disquali1l.cation-Leaving Work Because of Trade 
Dispute.-Restaurant employees were not disqualified by Un-
employment Insurance Act, § 56(a), from receiving benefits 
because they left work in the course of a trade dispute, where 
a reduction of wages and changes to more onerous conditions 
of work, which were not subjects of the dispute, were imposed 
,by the employers for the sole purpose of coercing the em-
employees' unions into bargaining collectively with the employ-
ers' representative, and were to continue only until the unions 
agreed to do so. The employees left their work because of 
this economic weapon, and not because of the trade dispute 
then in exis,tence. 
[3] Labor - Economic Pressure Activities. - A strike sanction 
merely indicates approval by a central agency of a possible 
strike, and is primarily a threat of economic aCtion. 
[4] Unemployment Relief - Disquali:fication ~ Leaving Work Be-
cause of Trade Dispute.-A strike against a single member of 
an employers' collective bargaining unit involves economic 
action against that employer only, and subjects to disqualifi-
cation under the Unemployment Insurance Act those employees 
only who leave their work because of the dispute. If the other 
employers thereupon choose to close their establishments' and 
[1] See 11 Cal.Jur. Ten-year SuPP. (Pocket Part), "Unemploy-
ment Reserves and Social Security." 
McK. Dig. References: [1,2,4, 6J Unemployment Relief; [3,5] 
Labor, § 20a. 
in 
7J6 
[5] 
[6] 
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lock out their employees, such employees cannot be charged 
with leaving their work because of a trade dispute. 
Labor-Economic Pressure Activities.-A picket line is an 
economic weapon directed against the employer by a union 
and recognition by it by a fellow worker amounts in effect to 
participation by him in the trade dispute it represents, whereas 
an economic weapon created by employers and directed against 
employees for the purpose of compelling their unions into 
bargaining collectively with the employers' representative may 
alone, rather than the trade dispute that occasioned such 
weapon, be the cause of the employees leaving their work. 
Unemployment Relief-Disqualification-Temporary Disquali-
fication.-The Employment Commission was justified in finding 
that a 25 per cent reduction in earnings imposed on a single 
restaurant worker would give him good cause for leaving his 
work so as not to subject him to the temporary disqualification 
imposed by Unemployment Insurance Act, § 58(a), upon one 
who "left his most recent work voluntarily without good cause, 
if so found by the commission." And the fact that the reduc-
tion in wages, which was not the subject of a labor dispute, 
was imposed on all the employees involved instead of only on 
a single one did not preclude such reduction from being good 
cause for leaving for each of them. 
PROCEEDING in mandamus to compel the California 
Employment Commission to vacate decisions ordering pay-
ment of unemployment benefits. Writ denied. 
Brobeck, Phleger & Harrison, Gregory A. Harrison, George 
O. Bahrs, James L. Feely and Richard Ernst for Petitioners. 
Robert W. Kenny, Attorney General, John J. Dailey, 
Deputy Attorney General, Forrest M. Hill, Charles P. Scully, 
Gladstein, Grossman, Margolis & Sawyer, Ben Margolis and 
William Murrish for Respondents. 
TRAYNOR, J.-In this proceeding certain San Francisco 
restaurant operators seek a writ of mandamus to compel the 
California Employment Commission to vacate its decisions 
ordering the payment of unemployment insurance benefits to 
petitioners' employees during July and August, 1941. Be-
fore that time the various local unions of the Hotel and Res-
taurant Employees' International Alliance & Bartenders' 
International League of America dealt only with individual 
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employers. It was the general practice for the local Joint 
Executive Board that represented the local unions to dis-
tribute cards to each employer upon which were printed the 
wage scales and conditions of work prescribed by the unions. 
If the employer agreed to abide by these terms he was given 
a display card to indicate that he was operating under union 
conditions, but there was no written c<;>llective bargaining 
agreement. In February, 1941, the unions issued new cards 
providing for more favorable conditions of work. Shortly 
thereafter, a number of the restaurant operators, including 
petitioners, joined the San Francisco Employers' Council for 
the purpose of bargaining collectively with their employees as 
to wages, hours and conditions of work. On May 6, 1941, the 
Employers' Council notified the Joint Board that it repre-
sented a number of the restaurants and wished to negotiate 
a single contract on their behalf. It stated that the terms of 
employment prescribed in the new shop cards were unaccept-
able and requested that a committee representing the unions 
meet with the employers' representatives for the purpose of 
bargaining collectively. The Joint Board refused this request 
and indicated that it would continue as before to prescribe 
terms and conditions of work. On May 19, 1941, the Em" 
ployers' Council notified the Joint Board and the unions com-
prising it that the restaurants represented by the council in-
tended to cancel all contracts with the unions as of June 30, 
1941, unless such contracts were extended by mutual agree-
ment pending further joint negotiations and that in the event 
of such cancellation, the restaurants would thereafter operate 
under terms deemed by the owners thereof to be essential to 
the continued operation of their places of business. When 
union representatives subsequently requested individual res-
taurants represented by the Employers' Council to sign indi-
vidual agreements embodying the conditions of employment 
demanded by the unions, the restaurant operators referred 
them to the Employers' Council as their designated collective 
bargaining agent. The unions refused to deal with the Em-
ployers' Council, claiming that it represented only 67 of the 
2,000 restaurants doing business in San Francisco. The repre~ 
sentatives of the Joint Board nevertheless held one token 
meeting with the employers and subsequently offered to sign 
a master contract identical in terms with the unions' shop 
cards. At about the time of this proposal, the unions obtained 
. 24 C.2d-', .. 
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sanction from the San Francisco Central Labor Council to 
strike two of the restaurants that had joined the Employers' 
Council, but this sanction was never used. On July 1, 1941, 
the employers submitted a proposed collective bargaining 
agreement to the Joint Board and offered to continue oper-
ations on the old terms pending negotiations. The unions re-
jected this proposal, reiterating their demand for individual 
agreements for more favorable conditions of work, and on 
that day directed employees of one of the restaurants to strike 
if the owner refused to sign such an agreement. The following 
day the restaurant owners' policy committee met and formu-
lated a plan of action, and on July 3, 1941, the employers 
posted notices in their establishments that until the Joint 
Board and the unions agreed to negotiate collectively, wages 
would be reduced to 75 per cent of the previous rate, a six 
day week would replace the prevailing five day week, and 
split shifts instead of straight shifts would apply to all culi-
nary workers. The unions, however, instructed their members 
to continue working. On Monday, July 7th, and Tuesday, 
July 8,1941, most of the employers who had posted the notice 
paid their employees at the new rate. A number of the em-
ployees thereupon quit their work because of the cut in their 
wages and the employers subsequently closed their places of 
business. On Tuesday, July 8, 1941, the employers decided to 
close all their establishments at the end of that business day. 
No strike was ever declared and a number of the claimants 
herein were not on duty at the time the wages were paid at 
the new rate and the restaurants closed, but found their places 
of employment closed when they returned to work or did not 
report for work because they had heard of the closing. 
The initial determinations of the adjustment bureau of the 
commission denied benefits upon the ground that claimants 
were disqualified under section 56(a) of the Unemployment 
Insurance Act. (Stats. 1935, p. 1226 as amended; 2 Deering's 
'Gen. Laws, 1937, Act 8780d, § 56(a).) The cases were con-
solidated for hearing before the referee, who denied benefits 
to some claimants but granted them to others. There were 
also consolidated hearings before the commission, which, with 
one member absent and one dissenting, awarded benefits to 
claimants. It held that the employers' imposition of a split 
shift, a six-day week, a twenty-five per cent cut in wages, and 
il; uniform par-dar, for the sole purpose of compelling the em- ' 
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ployees to bargain collectively with this group of employers 
W:LS tantamount to a lockout, that the employees consequently 
left work a~ the result of the employers' acts and not volun-
tarily and that they were therefore not disqualified under 
I'(\ction 5G(a) of the act. Certain employers thereupon peti-
tioned the District Court of Appeal, First Appellate District, 
Division Two, for a writ of mandamus to compel the commis-
sion to set aside its decisions, to deny payment of the benefits, 
and to refrain from making any entries charging petitioners' 
accounts with such benefits. The district court issued an 
alternative writ and restrained the commission from taking 
further proceedings in the matter, but before the case was 
heard it was transferred to this court. The claimants appear 
as interveners in these proceedings. 
'1'he basic facts underlying the present controversy are un-
di!;puted, and although the facts differ as to particular claim-
ants, petitioners have regarded the case as involving oniy 
workers who left their jobs because their employers substan-
tially reduced wages and imposed less favorable conditions of 
work, and base their claim for relief solely upon alleged errors 
of law in the commission's interpretation of section 56 (a) as 
permitting the award of benefits to such workers. As this 
factual case is the most favorable one they can present and 
does not warrant the issuance of the writ, it is unnecessary 
to inquire into the facts of each claim. 
Petitioners contend that the claimants are clearly within 
the disqualification of section 56(a), which declares an indi-
vidual ineligible for benefits "If he left his work because of 
a trade dispute .... " (2 Deering's Gen. Laws, 1937, Act 
8780d, § 56(a).) They reason that there was no lockout in 
the present case because they did not, shut down their places 
of business and refuse work to their employees to compel ac-
ceptance of terms and conditions of employment (cf. Barnes 
v. Hall, 285 Ky. 160 [146 S.W.2d 929, 936-9371), that the 
claimants could have continued working either at the reduced 
wages or at the regular wages had they consented to bargain 
collectively with the employers' representative, and that their 
leaving was therefore a voluntary act bring-ing them within 
the disqualification of section 56(a). (See Bodinson Mfg. 00. 
v. Oalifornia Emp. Oom., 17 Ca1.2d 321 [109 P.2d 9351.) 
[1] The commission's decision apparently is based upon 
the conclusion that the leaving of work was not voluntary, but 
I 
"i 
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it also found that the leaving was attributable to the employ-
ers' changes in wages and conditions of work, to continue in 
effect until the unions would negotiate with them. Petitioners 
do not question this finding but contend that their acts were 
but an additional step in a trade dispute, and that when claim-
ants left their work because of suc:h acts, they left because of 
a trade dispute and are therefore not eligible for benefits. 
This reasoning fails to distinguish between leaving in the 
course of a trade dispute and leaving because of a trade dis-
pute. The act does not disqualify an employee from receiving 
benefits in all cases where his unemployment results directly 
or indirectly from a labor dispute, but makes him ineligible 
,only if he left his work because of the dispute. There must 
therefore be a direct causal connection between the trade dis:, 
pute and the leaving of work. It is conceded that when claim-
ants ceased working, a trade dispute between the unions and 
employers was in active progress, but this fact alone does not 
necessarily establish that the leaving was because of the trade 
dispute. The commission found that the leaving was caused 
by the reduction in wages and the changed conditions of work, 
which the employers declared would continue in effect until 
the unions agreed to negotiate with them. 
[2a] Although wages and conditions of work are normally 
subjects of labor disputes, the facts in the present case and 
the proviso attached by the employers to the changes made, 
clearly show that those changes were not the subject of a 
trade dispute in this case. A bona fide labor dispute between 
the employers and the unions existed for several months be-
fore these changes were announced. In the course of that 
dispute the unions were demanding more favorable terms and 
conditions of employment and individual contracts with the 
employers, while the employers were demanding that the old 
terms and conditions be continued and that the unions bar-
gain collectively with their representative. There was no sug-
gestion during this entire period that wages be reduced or 
more onerous conditions of work be imposed, or even that the 
employers wished such changes. Consequently there was no 
dispute concerning these matters. When the new conditions 
of work were finally announced by the employers, they were 
not offered as bona fide proposals for the continued operation 
of the employers' places of business, but were imposed for the 
sole purpose of coercin~ the unions into bargainin~ coUp" 
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tively with the employers' representative and were to continue 
only until the unions agreed to do so. Admittedly they were 
an economic weapon designed to compel compliance with the 
employers' demands, and when claimants left their work, they 
left because of this economic weapon and not because of the 
trade dispute then in existence. The fact that the trade dis-
pute was unquestionably the motivating cause of the employ-
ers' acts does not establish any direct causal relation between 
the dispute and the employees' leaving of work. (See Rhea 
Mfg. 00. v. Industrial Oom., 231 Wis. 643 [285 N.W. 749, 
753] .) 
Petitioners attempt to liken their action to that of the union 
in obtaining a strike sanction, striking a single member of a, 
collective bargaining unit, or establishing a' picket line. 
[3] A strike sanction, however, merely indicates approval by 
a central union agency of a possible strike and is primarily II 
threat of economic action. [4] A strike against a singie 
member of an employers' collective bargaining unit involves 
economic action against that employer only and subjects to 
disqualification under the Unemployment Insurance Act those 
employees only who leave their work because of the dispute. 
If the other employers thereupon choose to close their estab-
lishments and lock out their employees, such employees can-
not be charged with leaving their work because of a trade 
dispute. The threat of possible economic action involved in 
a strike upon one of a group of employers or in obtaining 
strike sanction bears no analogy to the employers' act in the 
,present case, for the latter culminated in actual economic' 
action against the employees that caused them to leave their 
work. The employers' acts are likewise distinguishable from 
notice to an employer that a strike against him will begin 
at a specific time. (Of. Employees of Utah Fuel 00. v. Indus-
trial Oom., 99 Utah 88 [104 P.2d 197, 200].) [5] Nor is 
there an analogy between the employers' acts and the estab-
lishment of a picket line. They contend that the decision in 
the Bodinson case (17 Ca1.2d 321) that one who leaves work 
because of a picket line leaves because of a trade dispute 
within the meaning of section 56 (a), precludes a distinction 
between leaving work because of the dispute and leaving work 
because of a weapon used in the dispute. The emphasis in 
that case, however, was upon the meaning of the word "left" 
!~;~ 
i !~ 
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in the phrase "left his work," and no question was raised as 
to any lack of causal relation between the leaving and the 
trade dispute. A picket line, moreover, is an economic weapon 
directed against the employer by a union and recognition of 
it by a fellow worker amounts in effect to participation by him 
in the trade dispute it represents. (In re Persons Employed 
at St. PaUl & Tacoma Lumber Co., 7 Wn.2d 580 [110 P.2d 
877, 884]; Andreas v. Bates, 14 Wn.2d 322 [128 P.2d 300, 
308].) The economic weapon in the present case was created 
by the employers and directed against their employees, and 
it alone, rather than the trade dispute that occasioned it, was 
the cause of the leaving of work. 
Petitioners cite a number of cases from various states hold-
ing coal miners ineligible for benefits upon the ground that 
their unemployment was owing to a labor dispute because 
they refused to work until a contract with their employers in 
process of negotiation was signed or a satisfactory interim 
arrangement agreed upon. (Block Coal & Coke Co. v. United 
Mine Workers, 177 Tenn. 247 [148 S.W.2d 364, 149 S.W.2d 
469] ; Barnes v. Hall, 285 Ky. 160 [146 S.W.2d 929] ; Jlfiners 
in General Group v. Hix, 123 W.Va. 637 [17 S.E.2'd 810]; 
Dallas Fuel Co. v. Horne, 230 Iowa 1148 [300 N.W. 303]; 
Department of Ind1tstrial Relations v. Pesnell, 29 Alll.App. 
528 [199 So. 720] ; Ex parte Pesnell, 240 Ala. 457 [199 So. 
726] ; Walter Bledsoe Coal Co. v. Review Board, -- Ind. 
-- [46 N.E.2d 477] ; see Sand01)al v. Industrial Com., 110 
Colo. 108 [130 P.2d 930].) In those cases, however, the cause 
of the unemployment was the inability of the employers and 
the unions to agree upon terms and conditions of employment 
to be embodied in a new contract or an interim agreement, 
rather than economic action taken by the employer. 
[2b] The finding of the commission as to the cause of 
claimant's leaving of work in the present case was one that it 
was entitled to make under the facts. (Johnson v. Pratt, 200 
S.C. 315, 332-344 [20 S.E.2d 865, 871-872].) This finding re-
jects the trade dispute as the cause of such leaving and is 
sufficient to support the award of benefits. 
Had claimants in the present case left their work because 
of the trade dispute, the merits of the controversy would be 
immaterial and there would be no occasion to inquirt' wllf'ther 
they had good cause for leaving. (See W. R. Grace & Co. v. 
Aug. 1944) BUNNY'S WAFFLE SHOP V. CAL. EMP. COM. 743 
l24 C.2d 735J 
California Employment Com., ante, p. 720 [151 P.2d 215] ; 
Dallas Fuel Co. v. Horne, 230 Iowa 1148, 1154 [300 N.W. 303, 
306]; Deshler Broom Factory v. Kinney, 140 Neb. 889 [2 
N.W.2d 332] ; In re Steelman, 219 N.C. 306, 312 [13 S.E.2d 
544, 548J; Johnson v. Pratt, 200 S.C. 315, 334 [20 S.E.2d 865, 
872].) [6] Since claimants are not ineligible for benefits 
under the provisions of section 56(a), however, the question 
arises whether, if they left their work voluntarily, they are 
subject to the temporary disqualification imposed by section 
58 (a) of the act upon one who "left his most recent work 
voluntarily without good cause, if so found by 'the commis-
sion .... " (Deering's Gen. Laws, 1939 Supp., Act 8780d, 
§ 58(a); Stats. 1939, ch. 674, § 14.) The commission found 
that a twenty-five per cent wage cut imposed upon a single 
worker would give him good cause for leaving his work. A 
substantial reduction in earnings is generally regarded as 
good cause for leaving employment (3 C.C.H. Unemployment 
Insurance Service 24,054 par. 1975.013 [Mass.]; 4 Ibid., 
30,040, par. 1975.033 [Nebr.App.Trib.Dec., App.Doc. No. 238, 
4/10/40] ; 4 Ibid, 32,033, par. 1975.027 [N.H.App.Trib.Dec. 
App. No. 5-7499, 9/9/38] ; 4 Ibid. 33,055, par. 1975.021 [N.J. 
Bd.ofRev. Decs. Nos. BR-35,539] ; 5 Ibid. 38,056, par. 1975.013 
[Oh.Ref.Dec., 1605-Ref-41, 3/26/41]; 5 Ibid. 38,157, par. 
1975.033 [Oh.Bd.ofRev.Dec., 11 BR-41, 1/31/40]; 5 Ibid. 
42,502, par. 8030.02 [R.I.App. No. 1640, 2/5/42]; 6 Ibid. 
46,053, par. 1975.01 [Texas 1598-AT-40, 10/2/40]), and the 
commission acted properly in so holding in the present case. 
(See Doble Steam Motors Corp. v. Daugherty, 195 Cal. 158, 
164-166 [232 P. 140] ; McDonough v. Goodcell, 13 Cal.2d 741, 
748-749 [91 P.2d 1035, 123 A.L.R. 1205]; Bank of Italy v. 
Johnson, 200 Cal. 1, 16 [251 P. 784] ; Shields v. Utah Idaho 
C. R. Co., 305 U.S. 177, 185 [59 S.Ct. 160, 83 L.Ed. 111].) 
Since the reduction in wages was not the subject of a labor 
dispute, the fact that it was imposed upon all petitioners' em-
ployees instead of only upon a single one does not preclude 
it from being good cause for leaving for each of them. An 
employer cannot effect the disqualification of his employees 
with regard to unemployment insurance benefits by giving 
all of them instead of just one, good cause f{)r leaving. (Of. 
